Moraly incompatible adversaries – A touch of Amalek

Tevet 7, 5775

During the last few decades we have seen significant changes to warfare. After Israel’s Arab neighbours have lost their last great war against Israel (Yom Kippur October 6–25, 1973) they totally changed their approach to fighting Israel. The so called Palestinians started exercising this with the fedayeen, the approach of Arab terrorism gradually evolved. Today we see terrorist organizations to have become fairly independent combat units which don’t agree with any of our achievements to ease the consequences of war to the civil population. []

What if my morality becomes my weak point – what if my enemies barbarism becomes his strength? Since a few years we describe this problem elegantly as asymmetric warfare. In fact we mean that our adversaries don’t give a fuck on the Hague and Geneva conventions¹ and international law².

What if our enemy

  • doesn’t mind killing or raping our women and children?
  • indiscriminately fires at civilian population?
  • uses its own civilians as human shields
  • fights war with child soldiers?
  • supplements war with terrorism respectively war crimes?³

And what if our enemy through this practices gains an advantage, that becomes dangerous for us, as we forbid ourselves the exercise of such immoral methods?

Judaism can only be an answer if our adversary is able and willing to agree to morals. If our adversary doesn’t, Judaism suddenly only becomes applicable in the internal relationship with those who share our values. The external relationship to our barbarian enemies will not allow any moral sentiment.

So what can we do, if our enemy fires from behind human shields on our civilians? With the Dahiya doctrine⁴, general Gadi Eizenkot⁵ developed the right answer: In 2006 he paved the way to a form of escalation, that allows our soldiers to look into the mirror the next day. While to our current understanding of these asymmetric conflicts the Dahiya doctrine is the absolutely correct answer, it will only be understood, if our politicians give absolute warrant to our generals until we reach a point where political decisions need to be made.

» The Dahiya doctrine is a military strategy put forth by the Israeli general Gadi Eizenkot that pertains to asymmetric warfare in an urban setting, in which the army targets civilian infrastructure, as a means of establishing deterrence against militant use of that infrastructure. The doctrine is named after a southern suburb in Beirut with large apartment buildings which were flattened by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) during the 2006 Lebanon War, after Israeli jets dropped leaflets warning residents to evacuate. It has been suggested that Israel implemented this strategy in Gaza during the 2008–09 and 2014 conflicts. «

War is not political and once war is declared, our politicians should lean back and let our girls and boys in the IDF make and finish their job. In this course only a few turning points require political decisions:

  • The enemy waves the white flag
  • We need to wave the white flag (not an option)
  • The use of weapons of mass destruction

As Israel practically always gets involved in wars to defend herself, our politicians should have an easy job, but they don’t.

Continuously Israeli governments are put under immense pressure to stop the IDF. Of course diplomats do their utmost to avoid any proof of such pressure but everybody who reads the news can reason, that Israel has a few weak point foreign diplomats can use to blackmail us:

  • energy supply
  • Weapons supply (Israel needs re-supply with bombs, artillery shells, spare parts….. from other Western countries)

In order to avoid these deficiencies to be exploited by foreign countries, Israel must enable her defence forces to overwhelm her adversaries with ingenuity, fierce, power, rapid and complete success.

Today we see a lot, but what we always miss is completeness of success.
This could be compensated by ingenious supplements to the Dahiya doctrine. These supplements must vary between different conflicts. While in the north the IDF should occupy deserted⁶ territory. The invasion of IDF must be so intense, that almost all people flee. Subsequently the formerly displaced Lebanese Christians should be invited to settle there.
In Gaza, sections of the Gazan territory need to be freed from terror groups and while the current settlements (see Shuja’iyya) are levelled, new settlements for Gazans need to be built in a way that they are easy to administrate and to control. Nobody wants our soldiers to find themselves in a situation like they did between 2000 and 2005 in Gaza where riot Arabs pursued on Jews.

We need to give our politicians a stable majority to implement such doctrines. General Eizenkot made a good start during the Lebanon conflict in 2006, but his ideas need to be transferred into a complete political framework.

Once this is accomplished, Israeli deterrence will be restored!


1) this trouble
6) I firmly believe it was a fatal mistake by former defence minister Moshe Dayan to ask the fleeing Arabs in the West Bank to stay.